Epistemology, Analyze Solipsism and Methodological Solipsism
In epistemology and the philosophy of mind, methodological solipsism has at least two different classifications: The first is methodological solipsism which is the notion of epistemology that believes the individual self and its states are the sole possible or appropriate preliminary philosophical construction (, 2004). This notion is also called Cartesian Skepticism. While methodological solipsism is the theory that believes in mental properties or mental states of an individual that can be individuated based on the state or relationship of the property with other internal states of the individual itself, without any orientation to the society or the material world in which the individual is surrounded. (2004) and (1993) clearly defines methodological solipsism as the extreme position that states that the content of someone’s beliefs about, say, water has absolutely nothing to do with the substance water in the outside world, nor with the commonly accepted definition of the society in which that person lives. Everything is determined internally. Moreover, the only thing that other people have to go on in ascribing beliefs to someone else is the internal states of his or her physical brain.
While according to (2004), motivation for explaining the concepts of methodological solipsism into philosophy, there is a need to defend some internalist thoughts of mental state. For example, two people from two different worlds in some ways may have the same notion of the word “water.” However, the externalist claims that this is not possible.
The groundwork of solipsism is positioned to the understanding of a person about all psychological perceptions such as thinking, willing and perceiving by similarity with his or her own mental conditions by abstraction from inner experience. In this perspective, or some modification of it, and has been argued by many theorist, if not indeed almost all of, philosophers, since Descartes raised the egoistic exploration for unquestionable conviction to the category of the main goal of significant epistemology (, 2002). In this logic, then, it is at least debatable that epistemological solipsism is implied in most philosophies of knowledge and mind, and that any philosophy which accepts the Cartesian egoistic approach as its fundamental structure of reference is intrinsically solipsistic. The principles of Solipsism believe that: nothing exists, even if something exists, nothing can be known about and finally, even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it can’t be communicated to others. However, some theorists claim that solipsism is not making any sense because it is empty.
The dilemma of solipsism also values close assessment because it is supported by three extensively apprehended philosophical assumptions, which are themselves essential and widespread in meaning (, 2002). These are: (1) my most convinced knowledge is the substance of my own mind — my ideas, skills, affects, (2) That there is no theoretical or rationally needed connection between the mental and the physical between, the incidence of definite cognizant occurrences or mental states and the ownership and behavioral characters of a ‘body’ of a exacting kind and (3) That the experiences of a particular person are unavoidably personal to that person. These suppositions are obviously Cartesian in origin, and are very broadly established by philosophers and non-philosophers comparable.
Anti-ethnocentrism is a foundation of liberal discussions, seen as a way of countering inequality by pinning it to a theoretical foundation of permissiveness and fair play. As a supporting or personal declaration about being elected it can work quite well and fits with the liberalism rooted in the rhetorics of teaching and language teaching (, 2002). As a statement about what is achievable in terms of epistemology and eventually methodology, it becomes self-defeating. To stay away from the philosophical indigestion produced by trying to take critically everybody’s point of view and give it a foundation, Brain suggests the acceptance of an anti-anti-ethnocentric stance, which “it is an attempt to cope with the phenomenon of wet liberalism by correcting our culture’s habit of giving its desires for windows a philosophical foundation” .
This intellectual admission of ‘bias’ points of view on the shell rather bad to those like in ESL teaching where anti-ethnocentricity deals not only by other ethnicities but interpolated by institutional discourses of bi-culturalism that are required to apply in set of courses The philosophical critique helps to see the cry for justice in another light; as a traditionally comprised position which is strengthened by ‘borrowed’ discourses and creates examples of ‘bad faith’ (,1993). Taking it sincerely as a political plan though means in view of the ‘other’ as a probable discussion partner in a dialogue about how a person see things and eventually where is that person going. Here the ‘other’ as critical discourses of education that is represented with a view to enlarging the conversation in ESL and as a way past the traditional binaries that limit our views and practices
Debates about the extent and type of school racism have been prominent in educational research (, 1993). The substance of the disagreement concerns the question of whether or not schools are places which systematically deny equal treatment to ethnic minority children. It is complicated by different definitions of racial discrimination as it is practiced in schools, and by different methodological debates about how it is possible to know whether teachers and schools racially discriminate. These are two separate issues, though they are connected. Definitions therefore play an important part in the designation of methodological strategies for determining whether schools and teachers discriminate. There are a number of possible definitions, and which one the researcher adopts determines the type of data collection strategy they implement.
The first of these is the definition used by (2004): ‘Practices which restrict the chances of success of individuals from a particular racial or ethnic group, and which are based on, or legitimized by, some form of belief that this racial or ethnic group is inherently morally, culturally or intellectually inferior.’ This is a limited definition in the sense that the evidence required to prove or disprove it comprises testimony by those who are practicing it that they operate in this way because of certain specified beliefs. What this definition does do is discount practices which the practitioner is unaware of. Thus institutional or systemic forms of discrimination cannot count as examples; indeed, what this definition also rules out is evidence from those who are being discriminated against, on the grounds that they may be mistaken. What seems to them to be discrimination on the basis of the color of their skin is in fact motivated by other considerations, ie. a desire to correct poor behavior, life-style incompatibility or whatever.
Adopting strategies for determining whether discrimination, under this definition, occurs or not is further complicated by the difficulty of ever successfully probing the belief systems of those teachers, in the sense that even if they hold racist beliefs, they are unlikely to reveal them to the researcher because they are aware that the researcher will be antagonistic to their beliefs (, 1993). Their interview data are therefore almost certainly presentational. On the other hand, the researcher may be able to gather compelling evidence from other sources. For example:
Evidence of this type may allow the researcher to conclude that this teacher was motivated by racial prejudice, though they still have to ask themselves two questions: Is this an accurate representation of what happened? Do the words used by the teacher indicate that they are racially biased? Evidence of this sort is rarely available for the reasons given above and, furthermore, if this type of evidence was the only evidence available, it would be difficult to conclude that teachers in general were racist (, 2004).
A second definition could take the following form. Practices are deemed to be racist even if they do not, as it happens, discriminate against individuals from a particular racial or ethnic minority group, but are intended to have these effects because the teacher holds that members of certain racial or ethnic groups are morally inferior. Again, as with our first definition, the researcher is unlikely to be able to gather direct evidence of this, even if the teacher is motivated in this way. Further, it is difficult to believe that a teacher who was explicitly racist and who was determined to discriminate would not in fact have some effect on the life chances of the individuals concerned.
A third definition would include a notion of unintended consequences. Practices would be considered to be racist if they discriminate against individuals from a particular racial or ethnic group, but they do not have to be based on conscious or explicit beliefs that one group is inferior to another (,1993). This is a more complicated definition and involves the researcher in data collection activities which focus on whole-school practices. This definition, we are left with two possibilities. First, the teacher is not aware of hidden and unconscious biases they hold against members of racial or ethic minority groups and could not reveal them in the course of an interview because knowledge of them is tacit. Indeed, what may characterize the testimony of this teacher would be an explicit rejection of any belief that members of ethnic minority groups were inferior; they may even aggressively advocate non-discriminatory policies and practices. The researcher, in confronting this dilemma, may chose to infer from the teacher’s actions that they do in fact hold certain racist beliefs and at the same time that they genuinely do not know what motivates them. The researcher in effect conducts a psychological investigation of the teacher’s motives by examining the available evidence collected from observations about how they behave, and draws the appropriate conclusions from it. This is likely to produce conclusions which would certainly be disputed by the teacher him/herself and are also likely to be disputed by the research community at large.
What is at issue here is the amount and type of knowledge held by social actors. There are four different types (, 1993):
• Ignorance of motivations for action and ignorance of structural constraints and possibilities.
• Ignorance of structural constraints and possibilities but knowledge of personal motivations and intentions.
• Knowledge of structural constraints and possibilities but ignorance of personal motivations and intentions.
• Knowledge of structural constraints and possibilities and knowledge of personal motivations and intentions.
None of these perfect knowledge, but only knowledge which is relative to other social actors (, 1993). In other words, these are ideal characterizations and should not be construed as representing specific individuals or teachers in schools. However, what this typology does do is to allow us to identify the different dimensions of the knowing self, and what is significant is that the researcher cannot anticipate that all the social actors involved operate with the same degree and type of knowledgeability.
References
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